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Abstract
Preventive environmental policy may be aimed at stimulating structural change in
the consumption of materials. By reducing the resource input of production, less
emissions and wastes will occur that have a negative impact on the natural
environment. Several authors note that structural change in the consumption of
materials has led to a de-linking of materials consumption and economic growth
for developed industrial economies. This paper explores the concept of structural
change by presenting an overview of the relevant contributions to this field and by
investigating whether de-linking, enforced by structural change, has actually
occurred in developed economies. Empirical estimations are discussed by consider-
ing cross-section, time series and decomposition analysis. These different
approaches do not confirm de-linking unambiguously. Especially in the eighties,
structural change turns out to be quite insignificant.
, .:  -
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that a change in the structure of our economy may
play a decisive role in achieving sustainability. This implies a specific orientation of
environmental policy and strategies. End of pipe technology, for instance, may not
be sufficient to reach sustainability, since several emissions (CO,) and wastes can
hardly be reduced by add on technology. Economic growth will eventually boost
such emissions up till the point that they will cause irreversible environmental
changes. Environmental protection, especially in the long run, will therefore
necessarily be conceived in terms of structural policy. This has been called the
“ecological imperative” [Janicke  et al., 1993, ~1601:  In a growing economy the
ecologically detrimental effect of growth must continuously be compensated.
Initially, remedial environmental technologies can be successful. When such
opportunities have been exhausted, more fundamental technological and structural
changes may become essential [Opschoor 19901.
This paper explores the concept of structural change and the role it has recently
played in de-coupling’ environmental stress from economic growth in industrial-
ized economies by focusing on materials consumption2.  First an overview will be
given of the existing literature dealing with structural change and environmental
stress in Section 2. Most of it is concerned with exploring patterns in the input
side of production (materials and energy). Section 3 contains a reiteration of one
of these cross-section studies, reaching opposite conclusions. In Section 4 an
explanation for observed trends in materials consumption will be offered using
different models for estimating time-series in materials and energy demand. In
Section 5 a decomposition-approach is proposed for analyzing patterns in
materials consumption. This approach distinguishes between changes in the struc-
ture of final demand and changes in the technology of production. In Section 6,
the decomposition will be applied in a case-study on energy consumption in the
Netherlands between 1970 and 1990. Concluding comments are finally given in
Section 7.
2. Structural change and the declining intensity of use
A preventive environmental policy strategy may be aimed at stimulating structural
change. By reducing the resource input of production, less emissions and wastes
will occur that have a negative impact on the natural environment IJBnicke  et al.,
‘De-linking and de-coupling are being used here as synonyms
konsumption  refers here to the material use as input in production activities. Energy
consumption is defined as the consumption of energy as input in production activities and the
energy consumption by households.
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19891. This has been called ‘ecological structural change’ [Simonis, 19891.
According to Simonis  119891,  this ‘ecological structural change’ is the result of
process integrated investments that save energy and materials, and a shift in the
structure of final demand towards less polluting products. Evidence for this kind of
‘ecological structural change’ was found in Janicke et al. f19891, who compared
the time patterns in 31 OECD and COMECON countries between 1970 and 1985
for four indicators: the per capita consumption of tonnes steel and cement3,
Joules energy and the transported tonnes freight-transport4.  These four indica-
tors represent an approximation of the volume of ‘throughput’ of a country5.
For 1970 and 1985, each indicator has been expressed as the procentual devi-
ations from the sample mean in these years. Calculated in this way, the indicators
lose their physical dimension, so they can be added up together in an aggregated
environmental index, AE16 (see Appendix 1 on the calculation of the AEI).
Janicke  et al. [19891 are interested in the relationship between the AEI and the
level of income. The results of their cross-section analysis for 1970 and 1985 are
given in Table 1 (t-statistics have not been provided by Janicke et al.).
Regression equation: AEI  = u + l3GDP
Years 1 9 7 0 1985
Slope I3 0 . 17 0.046
Intercept (I -1 .2362 -0.3951
Measure of strength R’ 0.57 0.09
Table 1. Structural change measured as the relationship of the AEI and per capita GDP (measured in
1000 1980 USSI between 1970 and 1985 for 31 countries (taken from Jgnicke et al., 1989).
3Cement production figures have been used as a proxy for cement consumption. Since these
differ for some countries substantially (Greece for example, has a production level that is twice as
high as their consumption level), one can cast doubt on the appropriateness of this indicator in
reflecting the “ecological footprint” of a country, where import substitution is not counted as an
environmental gain (see Opschoor & Reynders [ 199  I] and Pearce [ 19931  on these concepts).
?Inly  rail and road transport is taken into account. This is justified by pointing out that these
modes of transport represent the final stages of a transport network. The magnitude of transported
tonnes by rail and road gives, according to Jiinicke et al. [ 19891, a good approximation of the total
transport chain which also includes international marine, inland waterways and air transport.
%n the United St ta es in 1990 cement consumption accounts for 18% and steel consumption for
22% of all industrial minerals and metals consumed in the US economy (construction materials
like crushed stone, sand & gravel excluded) [Berry 19931. The weight of freight transport in tonnes
(and not in ton-kilometres) is used as a general indicator of the volume aspect of production.
60 ne can question the environmental claim of this index, since each of the chosen indicators
leads to different environmental pressures. However, interpreted in the framework of Daly [1991],
it becomes clear that this indicator may give a true picture of the relative changes in the volume of
‘throughput’.
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This table shows that per capita income in 1970 gave a much better explanation
for the environmental index than in 1985: the slope is less steep in 1985 than in
1970 and the measure of strength has decreased substantially. The explanation
for the decreasing slope is that the consumption of the selected materials and
transport increased in the poorer countries, often more than the increase in GDP
(e.g. Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Turkey) while this consumption decreased in
absolute terms in several richer countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France,
Sweden, United Kingdom, West-Germany) between 1970 and 1985. In cross-
section analysis, such developments will show up as a decreasing slope. The fact
that the measure of strength has decreased can be explained by the divergent
developments of middle-income socialist countries (Poland, DDR, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary) which showed a very substantial growth in material consumption while
the growth in material consumption of middle-income countries of the OECD (Italy,
Spain, Ireland, New Zealand) stagnated. These developments are pictured in Figure
1 where the arrows give the linearized development between 1970 and 1985 for
various countries.
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Figure I: De-linking economic growth from environmental pressure. for some countries (Mean  E
1970 = 1985 = 0). Source: von W&ticker  et al. (1994),  after JGnicke et al.. (1989).
The analysis by Janicke  et al. have been interpreted as a sign of de-linking
materials consumption and economic growth through structural change in develo-
ped economies [Simonis, 1989; RIVM, 1991; Von Weizsacker  & Schmidt-Bleek,
19941. Several economies (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Sweden, United
Kingdom, West-Germany) showed ‘absolute structural improvements [Jdnicke  et
al. 1989, ~1781;  i.e. their aggregated material consumption declined in absolute
levels, despite the growth in GDP. These results have been influential for the
suggestion that it would be possible to grow out the environmental problems
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through structural change7.
As stated above, analysis on the resource input implies analysis on the consump-
tion of materials and energy. There has been a vast body of empirical investiga-
tions into the consumption of materials and energy from resource economists8.
These investigations also indicate structural reductions in the demand for materials
and energy since - in general - the first oil crisis. Most of these studies use the
concept of intensity of use as the ratio between the physical inputs (materials) and
monetary outputs (GDP). A hypothesis on the developments of the relationship of
the intensity of use and income has been put forward by Malenbaum [19781.
According to Malenbaum the relationship between the intensity of use and per
capita income could be described as an inverted U. This has been called the
“intensity of use” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the intensity of use is
expected to increase in the early stages of economic development, reach a
saturation level and then tends to decline. This last stage is often called the stage
of de-coupling or de-linking materials consumption from economic growth where
the income elasticities are continuously decreasing and may even become nega-
tive. Reasons for this observed de-linking have been summarized as [Tilton
1986al:  (i)  technological changes, such as material saving production techniques
and the substitution of metals by lighter chemical products, and (ii) structural
changes in the economy, such as the shift from a heavy-industry orientated
economy towards an economy which is relying more on services. According to
Malenbaum f1978,  p31  I, technological change would have the effect of a shifting
inward of the intensity of use curve as less materials will be used per unit income.
Diffusion of technology implies that the intensity of use curve over time will differ
among countries. Mexico in the nineties is unlikely to experience the same high
levels of intensity of use that the United States has experienced in the early
thirties, although they have a comparable level of GDP per capita.
It can be shown that the cross-section analysis by Janicke  et al. [19891 is in fact
equivalent to the intensity of use hypothesis. Figure 2 gives the hypothetical
intensity of use curve for four countries (Cl ..C4) with a shifting inward for poorer
countries, resulting from the diffusion of technology as mentioned by Malenbaum
[19781. Because of the diffusion of technological knowledge, the poorer countries
may not reach the same level of material consumption as has happened in the past
in country Cl . The thick line in each curve represents the period of measurement
(time 1,2,3)  for each country. If these countries are taken together in cross-
?-he  Dutch Environmental Planning Institute (RIVM, 1991) assumes, based on the work of
JZnicke et al. [I9891  that material consumption per unit income will decline by 20% in the year
2015 [RIVM 1991, pp 591. See for criticism [Opschoor,  19901.
$ee for example for energy: Humphrey, 1979; Bossanyi, 1979; Chesshire, 1986 and for
materials: Malenbaum 1978; Tilton,  1990.
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section regression analysis, period 1 will show a higher slope and a lower inter-
cept  than period 2 and 3’.
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igure 2: Graphical illustration that cross-section analysis that measure decreasing slopes and
increasing intercepts assume declining intensities of use for developed economies.
The diminishing slope and increasing intercept indicates that countries converge in
their aggregate materials consumption through time due to developments in the
intensity of use-curve as being predicted by Malenbaum 119781.  So the cross-
section analysis done by Jdnicke  et al. I19891 are.in fact part of an existing body
of knowledge: their results confirm a kind of parabolically shaped intensity of use-
curve for individual countries. Interpret in this way, their results can indeed be
seen as a suggestion for a process of de-linking materials consumption from
economic growth for the more developed countries in the period considered.
3. De- or relinking? Results from additional cross-section analysis (1966-
1 9 9 0 ) 1 0 .
The previous section gave an overview of studies that indicate a de-linking of
materials consumption from economic growth through structural change. This
section will discuss some weak points of the methodology that has been applied in
the study by Janicke  et al. [19891. A first observation on the study by Janicke  et
al. [19891 is that it only contains comparisons between two years. Virtually no
insight is gained in the development of the consumption of materials during years
4ne assumption is here: rising income levels over time.
‘orhis  Section is based on: De Bruyn & Opschoor [ 19941.
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in between. Hence the analysis is too general to draw strong conclusions about
the stability of the de-linking hypothesis. It might be possible that the aggregate
materials consumption declined from 1970 to 1980 as a result of the two oil
crises, but increased again after 1980. This would indicate that de-linking is not a
process which will autonomously lead towards less materials consumption in the
future. Secondly, an observation can be made on the representation of the
research results. In Figure 1, the AEI (Aggregated Environmental Index) for all
countries has been calculated for both 1970 and 1985 as the deviation from the
mean per capita consumption of the selected indicators in respectively 1970 and
1985. The arrows give the development between the deviations from the mean of
1970 and the deviations from the mean of 1985. Because the sum of deviations
from the mean is zero by definition, Janicke et al. do not compare the absolute
levels of 1970 and 1985. In other words, declining vectors in the figure do not
automatically imply declining absolute levels of aggregate materials consumption.
As the rise in the consumption of materials between 1970 and 1985 is not
apparent, Figure 1 only shows that the consumption of materials in the countries
with a lower per capita GDP rose faster relative to the countries with a higher per
capita GDP. In this way, the overall parabolic shape in Figure 1 indicates conver-
gence of aggregate materials consumption between countries and not de-linking.
This fact seems to be completely overlooked by many others referring to the work
of Janicke  et al. (eg,  Simonis,  1989; Opschoor, 1990; RIVM, 1991; Von
Weizsacker  & Schmidt-Bleek, 1994).
To overcome these shortcomings and provide a better insight in the process of
structural change and de-linking, we have repeated the analysis of Janicke  et al.
119891 for a sample of twenty OECD and COMECON countries: Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, the
Unites States, Western Germany and (former) Yugoslavia. Data for Luxembourg
have been added to that of Belgium because of the small size of the Luxembourg
economy. Data have been taken from international sources as indicated in Appen-
dix 2. Some improvements have been made according to the remarks made above.
Firstly, the AEI for each country has been calculated as the deviation from a
constant mean over time (see Appendix 1 on calculation of the AEI). Calculated in
this way, the absolute increase in materials consumption will be included. Second-
ly, cement consumption has been used as an indicator instead of cement produc-
tion which gives a more proper reflection of the ‘ecological footprint’ of a country
(see footnote 3). Thirdly, the period under study has been extended and includes
all years between 1966 and 1990. To obtain an overall -and yet comprehensive-
view of the relationship between the AEI and GDP, we divided the period under
study into four sub-periods of seven years: 1966-72, 1972-78, 1978-84, and
1984-90. These periods each represent a different stage of economic develop-
7
., --
ment in most market-economies in terms of economic growth figures. In the first
period, economic growth was high and not disturbed by external shocks. The
second period was marked by the first oil crisis in 1973, which influenced several
economic parameters. The third period was marked by the second oil crisis and
the subsequent negative growth rates in the beginning of the eighties for most
economies. The last period, finally, is characterized by a recovery in Western
economies from the crisis in the beginning of the eighties while the economy in
the formerly socialist countries collapsed.
The AEI for each country has been calculated as the deviations from the sample
mean per capita consumption of the selected indicators: steel consumption,
cement consumption’ ’ , energy consumption and freight transport by train and
road12.  The AEl’s  and GDP’s have been calculated as the average value in each
period of seven years. In this way incidental shocks in the economies or data are
levelled out.
To investigate the patterns of the AEI in all periods and to compare these with
each other, we are interested in the strength of the relationship between the level
of income and the computed AEI. The conclusion by Janicke  et al. was that in
1985 the relationship between the AEI and GDP (measured by the coefficient of
determination R2)  was weakened, and the slope was less steep (Table 1).  The
statistics of our cross-section regression analysis are laid down in Table 2.
Regression equation: AEI = a + f3GDP
Slope I3
(T-value)
Years 1966- 1972- 1 9 7 8 - 1984-l 990
1972 1978 1 9 8 4
0 . 0 7 6 5 0 . 0 5 5 2 0 . 0 4 0 9 0 . 0 4 3 5
(5.830) (3.926) (3.381) (4.711)
Intercept u -0 .5892 -0 .4188 -0 .3938 -0 .4624
(T-  value) f-6.725) f-3.800) f-3.734) f-5.061 1
Measure of strength
I32
0 . 6 6 6 0 . 4 7 6 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 5 6 6
St. deviation of AEI 0 . 3 3 0 0.311 0 . 2 7 5 0 . 2 8 3
Table 2: Structural change measured as the relationship between per capita GDP (measured in 1000
1985 USS) for 20 countries: descriptive statistics for four periods.
They show that the relationship, measured by the R2 was indeed weakened in the se-
“‘For all countries except for Italy, Japan, Spain and Turkey for which production data have
been used.
‘*Rail transport has been used for all countries, road transport for all countries except United
States, Spain, Italy and Greece. For these countries the quantity of freight transport was measured
by train only. This is the same routine as Jr?nicke  et al. took in their investigations in 1989.
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cond  and third period, compared to the first period. However, in the fourth period, the
relationship was strengthened remarkably. The slope has decreased until 1984 but
increased slightly in the last period. The intercept increased until the third period, but
decreased in the last period. Interpreted in the framework by Janicke  et al. this would
mean that the de-linking phase for developed economies has come to an end in the
last period under study. Although apparently structural change has played a role in the
second and third period, this has ceased to continue for developed economies in the
eighties. It seems that these economies are entering a period of re-linking rather than
continuing on the de-linking path. This is made more explicit by Figure 3 which gives
the developments for several individual countries from period to period. Each dot
indicates one period; the lines connect the dots for each country.
AEI
0.6
0.4 -
0.2 -
O -
-0.2  -
-0.4 -
-0.6 - TR
-0.6 - /
- 1 1 t 1 I 1
0 3 6 9 12 15 16
Per capita GDP in 1000 US dollars (1966)
Figure 3: Developments of selected countries in lavels  of AEI and per capita GDP, 1966-1990.
As can be seen from this figure three groups of countries can be distinguished. First,
Turkey is an example of a poor country that has not yet experienced any structural
change. The AEI has been rising faster than GDP in each period. Secondly, Hungary,
Greece, Spain’ 3 are countries that have experienced absolute improvements in the
last period (1984-l 990)  compared to the third period (1978-l 984). After rapid
increases in their levels of AEI in the second and third period, these countries now find
themselves in a period of de-linking. The group of richer countries show some more
differences in the developments of their AEI. However, most countries showed
absolute improvements in the third period, between 1978 and 1984. This develop-
ment of de-linking continued in the last period only for France and the United States; it
is remarkable that all the other countries showed a rise in their levels of the aggre-
‘+ogether  with Poland and Yugoslavia which have not been given in this Figure for reasons of
clearness.
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gated material consumption in that period. For Finland, Japan and Italy this has been
the case in each period, but the growth in their levels of AEI has been slackening.
Switzerland is the only exception on this generalized pattern: decreases in the second
period and remarkable increases in the third and fourth period as well14.
Having noticed that the absolute structural improvements reported by Janicke  et al
[19891  are rather an exception (induced by the years of measurement) than a general
rule, the question arises whether the developed countries are still de-linking in relative
terms: the aggregated consumption of materials may increase, but yet at a structurally
slower rate than the increase in GDP. This would result in a continuously lower
intensity of use of the materials involved. That this is not the case for several
countries, can be seen from Table 3 (see Appendix 3).  This Table gives the intensities
of use during the eighties of several countries for steel, cement, energy and transport.
It appears that the process of structural change was rather absent. The Netherlands,
United Kingdom and Belgium-Luxembourg saw their intensities of steel and cement
increasing, which indicates that the consumption of these materials increased faster
than their increase in GDP. Only the United States experienced decreases over all
periods. These observations will be used in the next section where we try to estimate
several models for the demand for energy, steel and cement.
4. Economic growth and income as explanatory variables for patterns of materials
consumption
The analysis in the previous section gave some suggestion for the fact that developed
economies showed, for some materials, a re-linking with economic growth during the
eighties. This would not only invalidate the conclusions by Janicke  et al. [1989], but
also the intensity of use hypothesis which predicted continuously lower income elasti-
cities of demand once economies have reached their saturation points. The question is
whether a de-linking as predicted by the intensity of use hypothesis is virtually non-
existent or whether high economic growth in the eighties simply has counteracted the
possible material savings that follow a path like the intensity of use curve.
The demand for materials can simply be written as the product of the intensity of use
and the level of GDP:
I, = i, l Y, (1)
where I, is the demand for material and Y, is the level of GDP in year t and i,  is the
intensity of use, defined as the ratio between the physical inputs and monetary
outputs (the division of the demand for materials by the level of GDP). The question is
thus whether the variation in the demand for material I, is mainly driven by variation in
‘%his  matches the relatively sceptical conclusions by Swiss researcher Binswanger [1993]  on
the process of structural change in his country.
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the level of GDP (the ‘growth’-effect) or by the variation in the level of the intensity of
use (the ‘intensity of use’-effect). To answer that question, three models have been
investigated. All the models have been expressed in terms of the first difference of the
natural logarithm of the variables, which gives an expression for the growth in the
variables. The models can be given as follows:
Mode/ 1: Variation in materials consumption stems solely from the variation in GDP:
A In I = /3,(  AlnY)  +E (2)
where the A stands for the first difference. Model (1) tries to estimate to what extent
the growth in materials consumption can be explained by the growth in GDP. It is
expected that f.3,  would have a positive sign, indicating that economic growth will
result in an increase in materials consumption. This equation assumes that materials
savings as a result of the declining intensity of use curve can be ignored.
Mode/ 2: Materials consumption follows a path like the intensity of use curve.
The intensity of use curve can be given in translog form as15:
I,- =fY,-Y,
(Q~+o+nY,)
Y,
+ 9
From this the demand function for material I, can be given as:
(3)
(4)
where TJ,  is calculated as the sum of c2 and 1. It is expected that f3,  exceeds one
and that l3,  has a negative sign (see Suslick & Harris [19901).  To avoid serial
autocorrelation, we have took the first differences of equation (4).  In the logarithmic
form, this becomes:
AlnI =  /3,(AlnY)  +  L$ {(InY,)’ - (InY,-,)‘} +  E (5)
This equation assumes that the ‘intensity of use’-effect gives the solely explanation
for variation in materials consumption. Note, however, that the first term on the right
hand side of equation (5) equals that of equation (2) in model 1. If economic growth
also influences materials consumption, the pure ‘intensity of use’-effect cannot be
derived from this equation. Moreover, the assumption in this equation is that without a
change in the level of income (zero economic growth) the change in materials
consumption will also be absent. This would mean that structural and technological
changes, responsible for the de-linking phase, are a function of economic growth and
‘?‘his  translog equation has heen  introduced in Suslick & Harris [ 19901.  It can be shown to be
equivalent to a lognormal distribution [Suslick & Harris, 19901.  This model implies an income
elasticity of demand that varies with the income level,  which is characteristic for the ‘reversed U-
shaped’ intensity of use curve.
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not of the level of income. Because this assumption seems to lack theoretical
background, we estimated a third model:
Model 3: Variation in consumption is a function of the variation in income and the
level of income.
This becomes in the logarithmic form:
A  In1  =  13,(  AlnY)  +  &(InY,) +  E (6)
It is expected that l3,  has a positive sign (representing the ‘growth’-effect) and l3, a
negative sign (representing the ‘intensity of use’-effect). Notice that this last effect
will be greater for high income economies.
These models have been estimated for the per capita consumption of steel, cement
and energy for each of the twenty countries mentioned in the previous section.
Income has been calculated as the per capita GDP in 1000 constant (1985)  USS 16.
Prices of steel, cement and energy for the US market have been added as an additio-
nal explanatory variable17. The results for Japan, the Netherlands and the United
States have been given in Table 4 (see Appendix 3). Each model gives a much better
explanation for energy than for steel and cement. Prices (parameter fi,)  are in general
insignificant at the five percent level, except the prices for energy in the Netherlands
and the United States18. The first model gives a poor explanation in general. It is
unlikely that the growth in the demand for materials can be explained by prices and
growth in income only. The second model hardly provides a better explanation of the
growth in materials consumption (one exception was energy consumption in Italy).
The parameter Q is nowhere significant at the five percent level, indicating that the
‘intensity of use’-effect is either absent or misspecified using this equation. Further-
more the signs of steel and cement consumption in the Netherlands and steel con-
sumption in the United States are opposite as expected. The third model gives the
best explanation of the growth in material consumption: all parameters have the
expected signs and most of them are significant. The first parameter l3, estimates the
‘growth’-effect of the economy on materials consumption. For the countries selected
in this table, this ‘growth’-effect is for all materials significant at the five percent level.
An economic growth of 1 % results, according to the estimators, in an increase in the
‘4f we below refer to consumption and income, we implicitly assume per captia consumption
and income.
‘?bis  may give a bias for the other countries involved in the estimations, because their prices
may differ from the US-prices. Unfortunately we have not been able until now to collect all the
prices for each country individually.
‘his  is in line with a number of other studies that found out that prices are in general not an
important variable for determining material demand [Auty, 1985; Holmes, 1990a, 1990b; Tilton,
1990; Mannaerts 19931.  The  demand for materials is typically a derived demand: derived from the
demand for final consumption goods. Material costs are only a small proportion of the total costs
for producing these goods [Malenhaum  1978, ~651.
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steel consumption of 2.4% in Japan, 3.4% in the Netherlands and even 4.8% in the
United States. This ‘growth’-effect is, however, counteracted by the ‘intensity of
use’-effect (parameter 13,  which has a negative sign in all cases). This parameter is not
significant at the 5% level for steel consumption in Japan and energy consumption in
the Netherlands and the United States. In all other cases, the effect of the declining
‘intensity of use’ that varies with the income level is significant. This effect is in all
countries greater in the case of steel than in the case of cement or energy. The
interpretation of the parameters is rather difficult, since the impact of n2,  the parame-
ter for the ‘intensity of use’-effect, will differ with the income level. So if the income-
level (measured in 1000 USS per capita) in the Netherlands is 10, this would result in
a decline in steel consumption per capita of almost 7% lg.  With an economic growth
of 1 %, this would finally make up a decrease in the steel consumption of 3.5% .
One interesting feature of model 3, which also would make the interpretations a little
bit more easier, is that it allows us to introduce the concept of ‘technological growth’.
Technological growth refers to an economic growth that does not result in a growth of
materials consumption but solely stems from improvements in the efficiency of
transforming materials into valuable products and income2’.  This rate of technologi-
cal growth can be calculated by solving the right hand side of equation (6) for the
case that the growth in materials is zero. This gives the following condition:
This equation can be expressed as:
(7)
(8)
By solving the right-hand side of this equation for the parameters estimated from
model 3 and the level of income, the maximum rate of the economic growth is
obtained. It indicates which rate of growth will not result in a higher consumption of
the selected materials. Table 5 gives the results from condition (8) for the United
States, Japan and the Netherlands for energy, steel and cement, where the prices
have been assumed to stay constant over the whole period. The average level of GDP
and the average growth over 1966 till 1990 have been chosen as explaining variables.
‘9Calc~lat~  by taking the natural logarithm of 10 and multiplying this by 0,
‘orhis zero growth in mat&A  consumption could also be interpret&  as a first step towards
envisaging a steady state [Daly, 19893. Daly 11989, ~651  discusses the installation of depletion
quotas: “to be set near the existing extraction rates. The first task would be to stabilize, to get off
the growth path. Later we could try to reduce quotas to a more sustainable level, if present flows
proved too high.”
13
Table 5: Model 3 and the concept of ‘technological growth’
Calculated using average income level and average annual rate of growth over 1966 till
1990. Per capita figures of steel, cement, energy and income have been taken.
Japan Steel
Energy
Cement
Netherlands Steel
Energy
Cement
United States Steel
Energy
Cement
l estimated using the parameters
10% level.
GDP Materials consmpt.
Technolog.
growth’
Actual
growth
Pred.
growth*
Actual
growth
2 .68%
2.05%
2.92%
1.83%
1.05%
2.08%
1.98%
0.80%
1.58%
4.56%
4.56%
4.56%
2.21%
2.21%
2.21%
1.56%
1.56%
1.56%
m OLS regression of model
4 .19% 3.67%
3.32% 3.39%
2.43% 2.48%
1.19% 2.21%
2.30% 0.94%
0.16% 0.18%
-2.11% -1.71%
0.72% 0.66%
-0.10% 0.47%
All parameters were significant at the
The fifth and the last column in this Table compare the annual growth rate predicted
by the model with the actual annual growth rate. This shows that the fit of the model
is rather good, except for energy consumption in the Netherlands and cement
consumption in the United States. In column 3 the rate of technological growth, as
has been calculated from equation (8) is presented. It appears that the rate of
technological growth in Japan is for all materials about 1 percent point higher than in
the Netherlands and the United States. Furthermore, the rate of technological growth
seems for energy in all countries lower than for cement and steel, which indicates that
economic growth will sooner result in a rise in energy consumption than in a rise in
steel or cement consumption.
What is the reason that the rate of technological growth is higher in Japan than in the
Netherlands and the U.S.? From equation (8) we can see that the rate of technological
growth will be determined by the ratio of the parameter of the ‘intensity of use’-effect
and the parameter for the ‘growth’-effect, together with the level of income. This ratio
reveals something about a process of structural change that may have played a more
pronounced role in the Japanese economy than in the Dutch and U.S. economy. The
forces behind this proces  of structural change can be clarified using a decomposition
methodology in analyzing changes in the intensity of use in a country. This will be
discussed in the next section.
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5. Analyzing patterns in the intensity of use: decomposition into structural and techno-
logical changes.
The previous section has shown that structural changes in material consumption are a
function of a ‘growth’-effect and an ‘intensity of use’-effect. With an equation that is
based on this insight better explanations for the growth in material consumption may
be being offered than with the usual translog intensity of use function used by
resource economists (model 2). Indeed, the fact that the intensity of use curve seems
to be invalid has also been noted by other economists [Auty  1985, Tilton  1986,
Valdes 19901. Quite recently, they became dissatisfied with simply linking materials
consumption to income. The intensity of use-hypothesis virtually provides no insight
into the factors underlying materials consumption. Moreover, the predictive power
from translog models capturing the inverted U-shape proved to be rather poor,
especially during the eighties [Valdes,  19901. Radetzki & Tilton  [19901  have argued
that a movement along the intensity of use curve can only be explained by changes in
the structure of final demand, while technological changes in a country would shift the
intensity of use curve downwards. As a logical result, regression analysis using the
translog model will usually capture both effects and lead to wrong predictions2’.
All this confirms our results from the previous section where it was shown that
economic growth would positively influence materials consumption, despite the
material savings predicted by the intensity of use-hypothesis. However, resource
economists have not searched for solutions to this problem in building other equations,
but developed a new approach towards studying changes in the intensity of use using
an aggregated decomposition methodology [Tilton  1986a;  see also Bossanyi, 19791.
It is usual to decompose the intensity of use into two separare  effects: the material
composition of products and the product composition of income. As a general
formalization the following identity can be used22:
= - • -r, Q, y, (9)
IU  MCP PC1
In this formula I, are the inputs (for example steel), Y, is the gross monetary output
level (GDP) and 0, the physical output, such as the produced numbers of a certain
final consumption good (for example batteries). The left hand defines the intensity of
use as the ratio between physical inputs and monetary output. The first ratio of the
right hand side (It/Q,) gives the material composition of products (MCP) [Tilton
1986al.  The MCP can be regarded as the average amount of a material (steel) that is
embodied in one product, such as an automobile. It depends on the state of technol-
” For a clear graphical presentation of this last point see Radetzki & Tilton [ 1990, p29].
” This equation is derived from a simple demand based model which can be found in
Radetzki & Tilton [ 19901.
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ogy that is being applied. The second ratio (Q,/Y,)  gives the product composition of
income (PCI)  that is used as a proxy for the amount of income that is spent on
physical products. According to Tilton  [1986al  this product composition of income is a
function of structural changes in the economy such as the shift from an economy
orientated at heavy industry towards an economy orientated at services. So, with
equation (91,  a distinction between technological and structural changes can be made.
Although such a division may lead to useful insights in the demand for materials, the
application of it in empirical analysis is unnecessarily complicated and limited, as will
be shown below. For one material (e.g., steel) and one product (e.g., automobiles), it
may be useful to determine whether a change in the steel intensity of use in automo-
bile manufacturing stems from changes in the MCP or PCI. It may be useful to
determine whether the MCP has changed because steel has been substituted for other
materials or whether the PCI has changed as a result of the fact that automobiles have
higher prices and value added, so that less automobiles can be bought with the same
amount of money. Complications will occur if more products are analyzed together.
Suppose that an economy produces only bicycles and automobiles. The decomposition
of the steel intensity of use in automobile and bicycle manufacturing provides useful
insights. For the whole economy, this may not be the case. The reason is that
substitution between products can hardly be incorporated in this analysis. Substitution
may not result in a change in the intensity of use of individual products (assuming
constant economies of scale), but will yet influence the intensity of use of the whole
economy. Simply adding the inputs, products and monetary outputs of automobiles
and bicycles together will render meaningless interpretations of the PCI and MCP.
Suppose that for two points in time the inputs and monetary outputs for the whole
economy stay the same, but that the production of bicycles over time has decreased
by 50%, while the automobile production in the same period increased by 5%. This
will show up as an increase in the MCP and a decrease in the PCI, while the intensity
of use will stay the same. Information on this aggregated level is difficult to interpret
unambiguously; in the MCP and PCI-terms complex information regarding substitution
is incorporated. One possible escape from this is to represent 0, not as the numbers
of production, but as the total input of material 1,  that is being embodied in the
product, as has implicitly been done by Roberts [19901.  Then it may be possible to
add different products on their material content. However, it is clear that such data
will seldomly be available. Subsequently the division by Tilton  I19861 pretends to
allow a distinction between technological changes and changes in the structure of
final demand, but fails to do so because the various products cannot be added.
Therefore, another approach will be attempted: we propose a seggregated decompo-
sition of the intensity of use into intrasectoral and intersectoral changes. lnrrasectoral
changes in the intensity of use are changes within an industrial sector. The intensity
of use may decrease within an industrial sector as a result of increased efficiency in
the processing stage [McSwineey & Hirako, 19901, higher prices of the products as a
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result of more sophistication of the product23, dematerialisation of the products
[Herman et al., 19891 or substitution of input materials (transmaterialization according
to [Wadell  & Labys, 19881). These factors can all be labelled  technological changes.
lntersectoral changes in the intensity of use represent then changes in the structure of
final demand, such as the shift from an economy orientated around heavy industry
towards an industry orientated around services.
The distinction between intrasectoral and intersectoral changes in the intensity of use
can mathematically be specified and empirically applied. It requires that data are
available on the input of material i, li,i,t  and value added Yi,t  for a range of {j = 1 ..n}
sectors. Sectors include the production of final consumption goods, investment goods
and intermediates. The intensity of use of the total economy in year t is the sum of
the inputs of each sector divided by the sum of the monetary output of every sector.
k'i.j.t
Overall intensity of use = j=l
n (10)
Cyj.l
j=l
The sum of the value added of every sector gives the GDP of an economy:
GDP =  eYj
j=l
(11)
Throughout this section, the variables that are not indexed by j will refer to the sum
over all the j sectors (and thus represent the figure for the whole economy). For
materials inputs, this means:
‘id  = kIij.4
j=l
and for income:
'l=il  'j.t
j=l
Equation (10)  can be rewritten as the sum of the intensity of use of the individual
(12)
(13)
‘several  products nowadays incorporate more knowledge than twenty years ago. For example
televisions, photo camera’s, bicycles and automobiles are becoming increasingly more sophisticated,
inhabit more functions and usually have higher (relative) prices or value added. The prices of new
automobiles manufactured in the United States rose for example between 1975 and 1985 by 27%
(deflated by the GNP implicit price index) [Eggert  19901. This is because new cars inhabit now
more functions regarding safety, power of engine and emissions control equipments than in 1975.
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sectors by weighting them by their market shares in outputs:
(14)
where the first ratio on the right hand side gives the market share of sector j, defined
as the value added of a sector divided by the total value added of the economy. The
second ratio gives the intensity of use of sector j. Taking the differences from
equation (14)  will result in the following expression for the change in the intensity of
use of the whole economy, specified in changes in the intensity of use of the individ-
ual sectors.
(1%
The interpretation of equation (15)  is quite straightforward: intrasectoral changes are
the sum of the changes in the intensities of use of the sectors individually, multiplied
by their market shares. Intersectoral changes are the sum of each sector’s change in
market shares multiplied by the intensity of use.24 Simple algebra will confirm that
the sum of intrasectoral and intersectoral effects equal the total change in the
intensity of use. It will be clear that the precise distinction of intersectoral and
intrasectoral changes will depend on the number of sectors that will be used in the
analysis. In general, the greater (smaller) the number ‘of sectors, the more (less)
changes in the intensity of use will be intersectoral of nature. If data can be found
that are sufficiently detailed, one could treat the lowest level of aggregation as the
fabrication process itself. lntrasectoral changes would then truly represent actual
physical efficiency.
6. A case-study on intersectoral and intrasectoral changes in the energy-intensities in
the Netherlands ( 1970-  1990).
The decomposition methodology that is described in the previous section, will now be
used in an empirical study of intersectoral and intrasectoral changes in the intensity of
energy-use in the Dutch economy. Three years of reference have been chosen: 1970,
1980 and 1990. Data for these years have been collected on energy consumption and
value added of ten industrial and six non-industrial sectors. The sources of the data
“?‘his  decomposition is not unique; there are other decompositions possible which will not be
given here, but see Ang & LW  [ 19941  on decomposition of the demand for energy. The decomposi-
tion which is given here gives a relatively large value for intersectoral changes, since some
interaction terms are incorporated in it.
18
are reported in Appendix 2.
The industrial grouping consists of the following manufacturing sectors: foodstuffs,
textile, paper, chemical, fertilizer, refineries, building materials, base-metal, metal
products and other industry. The non-industrial grouping consists of: agriculture,
mining, power generation and distribution, other public utilities, construction and the
service-sector which include commercial and governmental services. Energy-consump-
tion is measured as the energy-input that is being meant for fuel-combustion. This
results in the fact that energy that is being embodied in the final products (for example
naphtha) has not been taken into account. A second consequence is that the con-
sumption of electricity is not counted as energy-input. In general, the share of
electricity in the total energy requirement is rather low in industry25. The value
added consists of the value of sales of each sector minus the consumption of
intermediates (energy, materials, contracts conducted by third parties). Value added
equals thus the sum of salaries paid, depreciation of capital and levies paid for social
security26. Table 6 shows that the energy intensities, measured as energy consump-
tion divided by value added, differ greatly between sectors. Especially the fertilizer
industry and electricity generation have a high energy intensity. Both have a typical
labour-extensive and energy intensive production, so that they add relatively few value
added compared to their energy input. It is indeed quite evident that construction has
the lowest energy intensity because of the labour  intensive character of this kind of
activity. In Table 6 also the developments for 1980 and 1990 have been given in the
energy intensities, expressed as Laspeyres indices with base year 1970. These indices
show that the intensity of use of the whole Dutch economy have declined over these
twenty years. At first sight it is remarkable how much the public utilities and the
mining sector have succeeded in decreasing their energy-intensities. This is, however,
quite logical, because during the seventies, the Dutch have extracted on a large scale
natural gas and closed their coal-mines. Since the extraction of natural gas requires
less energy than the extraction of coal, this has lead to a much lower energy intensity
for the mining sector. For the public utilities, the distribution of natural gas instead of
the gasification of coal has resulted in much less energy use. In comparison, energy
intensities in the agriculture sector and the chemical industry more than doubled in
1980 compared to 1970. For the agriculture sector this is due to the boom in horticul-
ture which uses natural g.as  for heating purposes. The industry as a whole had in
1980 a slightly higher energy-intensity than in 1970. However, in 1990 the energy
intensity has also declined in the industry. The share of industry in total GDP (the last
three columns of Table 6) declined in 1980, but increased afterwards to 20% in
1990. The market share for the mining sector almost quadrupled, due to the large
%I future research elecctricity  consumption will also be included. A correction for double-
counting must be  made then since electricity is produced with the consumption of energy-sources
by the power sector, and then distributed  and consumed by the other sectors.
26For  the non-commzrcial governmental sector, value added has been calculated in this way.
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scale extraction of natural gas. The contributions of base-metal and building materials
industry to the GDP have been declining over all the years.
Table 6: Developments of market shares and intensities of use of the Dutch economy
Sectors
Intensity of use
1970 1970 1980 1990
va lue indexnumbers with 1970-
=100
Agriculture and fishery1 5.01 100 217 128
Mining 3.63 100 6 2 0
Total industry 3.52
Foodstuffs 5.41
Textile 4 .35
P a p e r 15.78
Fertilizer 107.44
Other chemical 13.63
Building materials 15.64
Base-metal 14.32
Metal products 1.19
Oil industry2 4 3 . 2 3
Other industry 2.03
100 102
100 ii8
100 119
100 a4
100 4 5
100 226
100 101
100 119
100 147
100 ai
100 64
76 26 .8%
a3 4 .7%
53 1.1%
65 0 .8%
a 3 0 .3%
116 3 .3%
67 1.1%
33 1.3%
68 8 .6%
53 1  .a%
33 3 .7%
Electricity3
Other public utilities
Construction
Service-sector
Total economy4
33.63 100 98
11.34 100 2
0.84 100 6 7
1.56 100 51
5.60 100 76
80 1 .6%
1 9 0 .6%
23 8 .0%
4 4 55 .6%
61 100.0%
Remarks by Table 6
1. Energy data only for agriculture
2. Oil industry consists of refineries and cokesfabrication
3. Electricity includes production and distribution of electricity
4. Total economy excludes the consumption of fueltypes by households
Energy counted as TJ input, Value added in mln Dutch constant (1980) guilders
Energy intensities thus reflect the million joules input per guilder value added
Market share
1970 1980 1990
Measured in percentage of
total value added
5 .7%
1.6%
3.6%
5.3%
18 .5%
3.3%
0.5%
0.6%
0.2%
1.7%
0.8%
0.8%
5.7%
1.2%
3.7%
1.5%
0.7%
7.3%
62 .6%
100.0%
4.3%
3.2%
20 .1%
3.7%
0.4%
0.6%
0.1%
2.8%
0.7%
0.7%
6.3%
1.5%
3.2%
1.5%
0.3%
5.5%
65 .2%
100.0%
With these data, it is possible to calculate what factors have contributed to the
decreases in the energy intensity in the Netherlands. The question is whether these
decreases are induced by intrasectoral decreases due to improvements in the technol-
ogy of production, or induced by a change in the structure of the Dutch economy.
Using equation (15)  this has been calculated; the results are depicted in Table 7. Two
periods have been distinguished: the second column compares the developments
between 1970 and 1980 while the third column compares the developments between
1980 and 1990. It is remarkable that these two periods exhibit completely different
developments. In the first period, the intensity of use for the whole economy declined
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by more than 240h2’  It appears that this is solely due to intersectoral changes. The
structure of the Dutch economy has become less energy-intensive. Technological
changes, measured as the sum of the intrasectoral changes, have only played a
marginal role during this decade. It appears that energy-saving considerations within
sectors were not important in the way of producing (this is largely due to the increase
in energy consumption in the chemical sector). In the second period (1980-19901,  this
picture is reversed: the individual sectors have succeeded in an energy saving per unit
output of more than 22%, due to technological changes. The structure of the
economy has, however, been worsening. Changes in the structure of the Dutch
economy have resulted in an increase in the energy-intensity of more than 2.5%.
Table 7: lntrasectoral changes and intersectoral changes in the
intensity of use
Expressed in percentage change over 10 years
1970-1980 1980-  1990
Total economy -24 .14% -19 .80%
0.~.  intrasectoral -0 .53% -22 .46%
0.w. intersectoral -23 .61% 2.67%
Total industry 1.97% -25 .57%
0.w. intrasectoral 12.83% -28 .56%
0.w. intersectoral -10 .87% 2.99%
If only the Dutch industry is taken into account, these developments are a little bit
more pronounced. As already has been remarked, the energy-intensity in Dutch
industry increased in 1980 compared to 1970. It is remarkable that the intrasectoral
changes are responsible for this. The energy-input per unit monetary output has
increased by almost 13% in that period. It appears that especially the Dutch industry
was unsuccessful in applying energy-saving technology up till 1980. Because of a
shift in the structure of industry, more than 10% energy per unit value added has
been saved up till 1980. In 1990, this picture is reverse. Industry has succeeded in
cutting down their energy-intensities by more than 28%. Because of the unfavourable
sector-shift, which has contributed to a 3% increase in energy-intensities, the total
outcome is a saving in energy-inputs per unit value added of 25%.
This case-study shows that the method of decomposition proposed in this paper can
provide an answer to questions related to the declining intensities of use. As a main
conclusion of the application of this method to the Dutch economy, one can notice
that the effect of the first oil shock (1973) has resulted in a change in the structure of
our economy, while the second oil shock (1979-81) has resulted in technological
changes in production towards energy-saving.
‘?his result can (of course) also he found in Table  6 where the index of 1980 declined from
100 towards 76.
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6. Conclusions
Structural change is considered to be an important element in the de-linking of
materials consumption from economic growth. This consideration has been put into a
wider environmental economic context by pointing at the necessity of reducing
‘throughput’ as a preventive environmental strategy in achieving sustainable develop-
ment. The cross-section empirical work done by Janicke  et al., [19891  proved to be
premature in their,conclusions.  Our cross-section analysis on the consumption of
steel, cement, energy and freight-transport for twenty countries between 1966 and
1990 suggest that the consumption of materials has been increasing in several devel-
oped economies since the mid-eighties. Also the parabolic intensity of use curve
IMalenbaum,  19781 turned out to provide weak explanatory power in time-series
analysis. Explaining materials consumption by distinguishing between a ‘growth’-effect
and an ‘intensity of use’-effect seems more fruitful for further applications. It appears
that the demand for materials is positively influenced by the growth in income and
negatively by the level of income. This ‘intensity of use’-effect is not always signifi-
cant. The growth rates of the Dutch, Japanese and U.S. economies between 1966
and 1990 have been well above the rate of ‘technological growth’, i.e. the rate of
growth where the increase in income does not lead to a higher consumption of
materials. Statistical decomposition methods can provide us with answers to the
factors underlying the changes in the intensity of use. The here developed method
makes clear why energy saving in the Netherlands has been so much higher in the
seventies than in the eighties, despite the launching of energy saving programs in the
eighties. The process of structural change, defined here as a change in the structure
of the economy, turned out to be rather absent in the eighties. Contrary to the
seventies, the structure of the Dutch economy has become more energy-intensive:
sectors with a high energy intensity grew more than the sectors with a low energy-
intensity. This all places serious doubt on the stability of a process of structural
change which has been forecasted by environmental economists as the driving force
behind de-linking materials consumption from economic growth.
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Appendix 1. A methodology for the calculation of the AEI.
The calculation of the Aggregated Environmental Index (AEI) in Section 3 involves a two step
procedure. First, sample means have been calculated for all countries and all years. For each
indicator this was done using the following formula:
where i=indicator(l..4),  c=  coun1ry(1..20).  I= yesr(1966..1990),Xi  = percapita consumptionofindicatori,  POP =
p o p u l a t i o n ,  C i  =  m e a s u r e d  y e a r l y  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  i n d i c a t o r  i .
The environmental index (AEI) for each country c and for each year t is then calculated by adding the
relative deviations from the mean per capita consumption of each indicator (X i,c,,), dividing it by 4
which results in an equal weighting of each indicator. In formula this becomes:
The formula used by Jgnicke  et al. [ 19891  differ from this, since the sample mean was year-specific:
i.e. the summation signs over the years 1966 till 1990 in equation (16) were not taken into account.
Both for 1970 and 1985 they calculated the AEI as the deviations from the mean for respectively 1970
and 1985.
Appendix 2. Data sources and data quality.
Our data were taken from a number of international sources as listed below.
Cement consumption: Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations:
“Annual Report on Housing and Building.“. United States:
CRB: “Commodity Yearbook”. For Italy, Japan, Spain and
Turkey: cement production from Statistical Office of the
United Nations: “Statistical Yearbook”.
Energy consumption:
Steel consumption:
Measured as Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES). Intemati-
onal  Energy Agency (IEA): “Energy Balances of OECD
Countries”, “Energy Balances of Non-OECD countries”,
“World Energy Statistics and Balances”; For Hungary,
Poland and Yugoslavia before 1971 growth rates extracted
from: United Nations: “World Energy Supplies” (Total Final
Consumption).
Until 1987: United Nations: “Statistical Yearbook”. After
1987: Eurostat: “Eisen und Stahl” for EC members, Econo-
mic Commissions for Europe of the United Nations: “Annual
Steel Statistics for Europl”  for non-EC members. Series
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Freight transport:
Population:
Gross Domestic Product:
Structure of Dutch Economy:
have heen  standardized on each other using three years
averages.
Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations:
“Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics for Europe”. Intema-
tional  Road Fedardtion:  “World Road Statistics”. European
Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT): “Transport
Stat is t ics” . Especially for road transport series show diffe-
rences. Series have been standardized.
Worldbank: “Worldtables”.
Worldbank: “Worldtables”, 1992. For Yugoslavia, Poland
and Hungary before 1971 growth rates have been extracted
from : Summers, R, A. Heston: “A new set of international
comparisons of real product and price levels estimates for
130 countries, 1950-1985”  in: Income and Wealth, 1988.
Value Added data have been extracted from: CBS (1985):
“Nationala rekeningen 1969-1981 met herziene reeksen  voor
dejaren  1969-1976.  From 1977 and on: CBS (1978-1991):
“Samenvattend overzicht industriestatistieken”. For the
fertilizer industry data taken from: Statistical Yearbook of
the Netherlands (1972-1993). For power generation by public
utilities, data taken from: Statistiek van de elektriciteitsvoor-
ziening in Nederland (1970-1991). Value added has been
calculated as gross value added using marketprices.
Energy input in Dutch economy: Delivered from CBS databases.
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T a b l e  3 :  I n d e x n u m b e r s  o f  the  i n t e n s i t y  o f  u s e  i n  t h e  e i g h t i e s
Steel Cement Energy T r a n s p o r t  E l
B e l g i u m 1 9 6 1 51.20 56.30 03.29 65.69 65.66
1906 56.25 44.54 01.37 91.16 60.94
1909 55.97 51.95 77.06 1 0 7 . 4 4 62.29
J a p a n 1 9 0 1 72.06 90.20 06.14 71.44 79.64
1906 71.13 64.00 77.43 65.29 66.37
1909 77.27 62.19 75.70 66.94 6 7 . 4 1
Netherfands 1 9 6 1 74.27 69.44 100.06 99.20 0 0 . 7 1
1906 7 1 . 0 1 56.20 105.76 90.09 74.00
1909 75.15 61.90 100.10 102.90 75.42
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 1901 47.03 56.22 79.13 94.06 61.95
1906 39.02 54.04 71.90 06.13 55.09
1909 43.03 62.60 66.40 9 4 . 0 1 50.45
U n i t e d  S t a t e s 1 9 0 1 50.37 79.43 92.60 9 5 . 1 1
1906 49.93 06.07 02.94 05.93
1989 40.01 79.94 01.02 07.06
I n d e x n u m b e r s  w i t h  lQ66=  100  b a s e d  o n  o n e  y e a r  m o v i n g  avarages
C o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  i n c o m e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  p e r  capita  f i gu res
74.17
66.34
6 4 . 2 1
T a b l e  4 :  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  m o d e l s  o f  m a t e r i e l s  c o n s u m p t i o n
M o d e l  1 M o d e l  2
dlnl  = bl(dlnY)  + bJ(dlnP) dlnl  = bl(dlnY)+b2{(lnYt)A2  - ( lnYt-1)
E x p e c t e d  s i g n s
J a p a n Steel
Cement
N e t h e r l a n d s Steel
E n e r g y
Cement
U n i t e d  S t a t e s Steel
E n e r g y
N o t e :
Cement
S l o p e
T-statistics
Fn  a n d  D W
b l
+
1 . 4 5 7
3.209
24.7%
-0.055 Steel
-0.117
2.224
b l b2
+
3.370 -0.503
1 . 2 4 7 -0.718
26.4%
-0.103 Steel
-0.216
2.337
S l o p e 0.939 -0.330 Energy 2.249 -0.343 -0.300 Energy
T-statistics 7.403 -1.472 3.170 - 1 .a70 -1.407
R2  a n d  D W 62.4% 1 . 9 7 9 67.6% 2.323
S l o p e 0.916 -0.142 Cement 2.722 -0.402 -0.274 Cement
T-statistics 3.940 -0.420 2.050 -1.381 -0.793
R2  a n d  D W 36.6% 1 . 1 6 7 41.6% 1 . 2 6 2
S l o p e
T-statistics
R2  a n d  D W
1 .a07
2.409
24.5%
-0.479 Steel
- 1.200
2.303
-4.792 1.643
-0.489 0.675
26.0%
-0.460 Steel
-1.164
2.294
S l o p e 1 . 4 6 4 -0.692 Energy 5.422 -0.964 -0.666 Energy
T-statistics 5.490 -2.041 1 . 5 4 4 -1.130 -2.749
R2  a n d  D W 60.7% 1.691 62.9% 1.913
S l o p e 0.779 -0.164 Cement - 1.067 0.460 -0.152 Cement
T-statistics 1.955 -0.540 -0.190 0.344 -0.496
fX?  and DW 1 6 . 3 % 2.204 1 6 . 7 % 2.202
S l o p e 2.610 0.026 Steel -12.159 2.740 0.017 Steel
T-statistics 3.356 0.064 -0.595 0.723 0 . 0 4 1
Ft2  and DW 32.2% 1.945 33.7% 1.097
S l o p e 0.773 -0.353 Energy 5.400 -0.079 -0.360 Energy
T-statistics 5.195 -2.746 1 . 4 7 5 - 1.260 -2.090
Ft2  a n d  D W 64.6% 1.111 67.0% 1.360
S l o p e 1 . 9 0 1 -0.201 Cement 0.522 0.257 -0.196 Cement
T-statistics 3.604 -0.547 0.039 0.103 -0.519
R2  a n d  D W 41.2% 1.261 41.2% 1.265
,.-.  . ^,  . *  -
b 3
cj+o;r(omr,
b 3
I n c o m e  l e v e l s  (Y)  have been expressed as  1000 US constant  (1985)  dol lars  per  capi ta
S t e e l  a n d  c e m e n t  c o n s u m p t i o n  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  k t o n s .  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  PJoules.
E q u a t i o n  3
d In I = bl(d In v) + b2  In Y +b3 (d In P)
bl b2 b 3
+
2.354 -0.029 -0.016
3.350 -1.616 -0.035
32.7% 2.310
1.379 -0.013 -0.056
6 . 4 1 1 -2.421 -0.241
70.3% 2.442
1.570 -0.021 -0.101
4.745 -2.557 -0.334
51.1% 1 . 4 2 5
3.396 -0.030 -0.517
3.430 -2.100 - 1.406
37.9% 2.547
2.032 -0.010 -0.553
5.259 - 1.930 -2.297
66.4% 1.942
1 . 6 2 4 -0.016 -0.254
3 . 0 2 1 -2.165 -0.905
31 .O% 2.006
4.706 -0.035 0.129
7.156 -5.293 0.472
70.2% 2.734
0.970 -0.003 -0204
5.003 - 1.526 -2.143
60.0% 1230
2.920 -0.017 -0.255
5.402 -3 .192 -0.020
59.0% 1.541
2 7
. ., --
